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Jurisdictions and causes of action: Commercial
considerations in dealing with bullying, stress and
harassment cases—Part I
Niall Neligan

B.L.

This is the first of a two part article in which the author will
critically evaluate the different causes of action and myriad of
jurisdictions for bringing a claim in the inter-related fields of
bullying, stress and harassment in the workplace from a commercial
law perspective. The author will define and trace the separate
headings under which the law governing bullying, stress and
harassment has evolved. In the second part of the article (which will
appear in the next edition of the journal), the author will examine
recent developments in tortious claims for psychiatric injuries
arising from bullying, stress and harassment cases, and raise the
question whether it would be more appropriate to streamline and
codify this area of law in order to provide greater clarity to potential
litigants and employers, and reduce the number of jurisdictions in
which claims are brought.

Introduction
That nature abhors a vacuum is an oft-used cliché but one certainly
worth considering in any clinical examination of the myriad of laws
that encompass the present regime for dealing with cases concerning
bullying, harassment and stress in the workplace. What is clear from
a cursory examination of the law presently is that the current
multiplicity of jurisdictions and cause of actions is unsustainable in
the long term, and in my opinion serves no-one's interest, be it client,
lawyer, tribunal or court.
Curiously, the inter-relationship between bullying, stress and
harassment is often overlooked by jurists and legislators and as such
they have in the past been classified independently. However, the
lines of demarcation between bullying, stress and harassment in the
workplace are far more nebulous; indeed, in many cases they are
symbiotic in so far that harassment is a form of bullying and stress
the result of such behaviour. In a recent report on Bullying in the
Workplace carried out by the ESRI on behalf of the Department of

Enterprise Trade and Employment, 43 per cent of respondents
surveyed, who were the victims of bullying in the workplace,
suffered from stress.1 The reductive approach taken in the past by
jurists and legislators towards bullying, stress and harassment in the
workplace has resulted in a patchwork approach to this important
area of law, hence the unsatisfactory situation where there are
overlapping causes of action and multiple jurisdictions.
This lack of clarity is a cause of concern for prospective litigants, be
they employers or employees, but more particularly for the
practitioner as illustrated by a case involving alleged bullying,
leading to a stress induced injury whereby the victim is forced to
resign from their work position. This poses the potential problem:
should the practitioner recommend the victim bring a case for
constructive dismissal under the statutory regime for unfair
dismissals (thus limiting their remedies and compensation), or
gamble and bring a case for wrongful dismissal where it arises, thus
exposing the client to serious loss if he or she fails in their action
before the courts?2 A victim who has suffered a stress induced injury
can initiate a claim for constructive dismissal under the Unfair
Dismissals Acts as well as a separate claim for personal injuries
before the Personal Injuries Assessment Board. However, this places
the victim in the unenviable position of having to initiate two
separate claims in two separate jurisdictions.
From a commercial, and indeed an employer's perspective, the
growth in cases involving bullying, stress and harassment present
real challenges to the running of commercial and public
undertakings, particularly in terms of organisational and
management culture. Increasingly, commercial and public
undertakings are diverting resources to meet such challenges ranging
from employee awareness programmes and management retraining
to re-writing health and safety statements. However, in the absence
of clarity in the law, employers often find themselves fighting
rearguard actions in trying to reconcile pressurised work
environments with complex and opaque legal rules.
One solution which has been mooted in respect of the above
problem is the introduction of comprehensive legislation along the
lines of the once proposed Dignity at Work Bill , introduced in 2001
by Baroness Gibson before the House of Lords.3 As to whether

legislation in itself would be appropriate in drawing together the
strands of bullying, stress and harassment in the workplace is in
itself a matter for debate. Nevertheless, the vacuous condition of the
present state of the law is a cause for concern for reasons which I
have set out below.4

Nature of bullying
As aforementioned, bullying is a nebulous concept with many guises
and can include:
“constantly criticising, belittling, degrading, shouting at,
humiliating, overworking, denying job information, singling out for
unfavourable treatment, threatening, ostracizing, trivial-fault finding,
applying unrealistic deadlines, assaulting and ridiculing”.5
Middlemiss and Hay in their 2003 research observed:
“[that] where such bullying or intimidating actions are perpetrated
by supervisory employees against other employees in the workplace,
it is often symptomatic of a poor organisational culture, which
perpetrates or condones such behaviour.”

Prevalence of bullying in the workplace
Arising out of research carried out by the ERSI on behalf of the
Taskforce on the Prevention of Workplace Bullying, about 7.9 per
cent of the Irish workforce recorded themselves as having been
bullied in the six months preceding the survey.6 The rate of
victimisation is approximately 1.8 times greater among women than
it is for men. Interestingly, the level of workplace bullying rose
substantially with increases in the level of educational attainment.
Indeed, men who left education on completion of third level have a
55 per cent higher chance of being bullied than their counterparts
who left education with a junior / leaving certificate or less. The
highest risk of bullying was found in the education (14%), public
administration (13.3%) and health (13 %) sectors. However, in the
private sector there are high incidences of bullying in financial

services (8%), IT (9%) and wholesale / retail (10.9%).7

The impact of bullying, stress and harassment cases
In terms of the victim, bullying can have serious ramifications on a
personal and professional level to the point where it can destroy a
person's mental health irrespective of the other losses which may be
incurred such as loss of occupation and financial loss. For an
employer it may result in a loss of productivity, absenteeism,
workplace disruption, staff discontent and possible litigation, both in
the civil and criminal courts. Aside from these considerations,
employers will also have to cover the cost of having to investigate
and respond to complaints by employees and the need to sometimes
remove or suspend an accused employee from the workplace; not to
mention the cost of having to find a temporary replacement for both
the perpetrator and the victim who may or may not be on sick leave.
As observed by Middlemiss and Hay8 :
“Victims of bullying will want bullying to come to an end but are
often powerless to stop it. Grievance procedures, normally invoked
to deal with internal complaints of employees, can be ineffectual for
dealing with claims of bullying”.
Middlemiss and Hay further note that:
“This is particularly true where the first stage of complaint for the
employee is to raise the matter with their line-manager and it is his
or her behaviour that is the subject of the complaint.”
Workplace bullying and harassment may arise in a variety of
different ways. It may be group-oriented (sometimes referred to as
mobbing), peer-related, hierarchical or involve subordinates.
Periodically, bullying behaviour can extend outside work hours and
include individuals who are not under the direct control of the
employer but who are to some degree associated with the employees
who are perpetrating the behavior against the victim in the
workplace.
In general terms it is assumed by workplace psychologists that all

employees will have been a victim of moderate or immoderate
bullying at some point in their career, whether overt or covert. The
degree of harm caused by bullying will depend on the nature and
effect which it has on the individual, so that some employees will
not manifest signs of bullying, while others clearly will.

Legal environment
From a preliminary examination of the law, there is no one statute
dealing with bullying in the workplace. There is however, a variety
of causes of action under which a bullying claim may be brought
against an employer. From an employer's perspective, he or she will
need to be familiar with the different laws and venues where a
bullying claim may be brought. Typically, a plaintiff in a bullying
case can rely on the following causes of action: breach of contract,
the tort of negligence, unfair dismissals, health and safety, and
equality law.
The law on bullying in the workplace is in a constant state of
evolution and nowhere is this more evident than in the tort of
negligence. It has long been established that employers owe a duty
to take reasonable care for the safety of their employees at work
whether expressed in the contract of employment or implied by
common law. Up until the mid-1990s this duty almost exclusively
concerned physical injuries sustained in the workplace. However,
over the past 12 years, since the seminal decision of the House of
Lords in Walker v Northumberland County Council , the law both in
the UK and Ireland has evolved to include a duty to take reasonable
care for employee safety from mental, psychological or psychiatric
injuries that emanate from workplace stress, harassment and
bullying.9

Defining the issues
In order to have a fuller understanding of how the courts deal with

these complex issues, it is necessary at the offset to define what is
meant by bullying, stress and harassment from a legal perspective.10

Bullying
There is no statutory definition of bullying; however, The Report of
the Expert Advisory Group on Workplace Bullying defines it in the
following way:
“Workplace Bullying is repeated inappropriate behaviour direct or
indirect whether verbal, physical or otherwise, conducted by one or
more persons against one another or others, at the place of work and
/ or in the course of employment, which could be reasonably
regarded as undermining the individual's right to dignity at work. An
isolated incident of the behaviour described in this definition may be
an affront to dignity at work but as a once off incident is not
considered to be bullying.”
The expert advisory group commented that the definition of bullying
is in a state of evolution. Examples of the type of bullying behaviour
envisaged in the report include the following:

〇.
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

undermining an individual's right to dignity at work;
humiliation;
intimidation;
verbal abuse;
victimisation;
mobbing;
exclusion and isolation;
intrusion by pestering, spying and stalking;
repeated unreasonable assignments to duties which are
obviously unfavourable to one individual;
. • repeated requests giving impossible deadlines or impossible
tasks; and
. • implied threats.11
Some commentators have noted that bullying of course is an entirely
subjective experience. Some employers may not be aware that they

are engaging in bullying behaviour—this can arise for example
where an employer/employee is over assertive and does not realise
there is a fine line between being assertive and being a bully. It is of
course entirely possible that the victim likewise does not realise that
he or she is being subjected to what amounts to bullying behaviour.
However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse and the courts have
demonstrated a willingness to act sternly with an employer who has
engaged in unacceptable behaviour towards an employee.

Workplace stress
As in the case of bullying, there is no statutory definition for workrelated stress. Guidance, however, has been sought from both
government and nongovernmental agencies. In 2000, the European
Commission carried out significant work in the area of work-related
stress, publishing a comprehensive document "Guidance on Workrelated Stress”. This document provided guidance and general
information on the causes, manifestations and consequences of
work-related stress, both for employees and employers. Within the
document, the Commission defined workplace stress in the
following circumstances:
“The emotional, cognitive, behavioural and physiological reaction to
aversive and noxious aspects of work, work environments and work
organisations. It is characterised by high levels of arousal and
distress and often by feelings of not coping.”
In the absence of statutory definitions both the tribunals and courts
have had to develop their own versions of what amounts to workrelated stress, relying initially on UK case decisions before
developing their own jurisprudence.

Harassment

Unlike bullying and work-related stress, harassment is defined under
statute—Irish law having followed American jurisprudence by
adopting a discrimination-based approach to harassment. The
Employment Equality Act 1998 prohibited harassment and defined it
as occurring where one person was less favorably treated than
another on any of nine separate grounds:

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Gender.
Marital status.
Family status.
Sexual orientation.
Religion.
Age.
Disability.
Race, that is discrimination on grounds of an individual's race,
colour, nationality or ethnic or national origin.
. 9. Membership of the travelling community.
The concept of harassment was broadened in the Equality Act 2004
and now reads as follows:

Section 14 (A) of the Equality Acts 1998–2004
“(a) an employee (in this section referred to as ‘the victim’) is
harassed or sexually harassed either at a place where the employee is
employed (in this section referred to as ‘the workplace’) or
otherwise in the course of his or her employment by a person who
is—

. (i) employed at that place or by the same employer,
. (ii) the victim's employer, or
. (iii) a client, customer or other business contact of the victim's
employer and the circumstances of the harassment are such
that the employer ought reasonably to have taken steps to
prevent it, […].”

Causes of action
Having defined the issues it is now necessary to consider the
different headings under which actions for bullying, stress and
harassment are brought:

. • Breach of express and implied duties under the contract of
.
.
.
.
.

•
•
•
•
•

. •
. •
. •

employment.
Harassment—Employment Equality Acts 1998-2004 .
Harassment under criminal and employment law.
Breach of contract—Wrongful dismissal.
Constructive dismissal—Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977-2005 .
Constructive dismissal—Employment Equality Acts 1998-2004
.
Section 9 application pursuant to the Industrial Relations Act
1969 .
Tortious claims for psychiatric injuries arising from bullying and
stress cases.
Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 .

Breach of contract
Bullying claims can result a breach of the terms of the contract
whether this arises under express or implied terms. Again it has been
noted by Middlemiss and Hay:
“[that] … Employers are unlikely to offer protection against bullying
to employees in the form of a written or oral express term in an
employment contract. In the event that an employer introduces a
policy for bullying or dignity at work and it is incorporated into
employees’ contracts of employment, then an express contractual
right to be protected against bullying would be provided. An action
for breach of a contract will otherwise only be available to a victim
of workplace bullying where it represents a breach of an implied
term of his contract.”12
Having considered a variety of authorities before the courts in the
United Kingdom, the authors formed the opinion:

“[that] … Where an employer breaches its implied duty, this can
represent repudiation by him of an employee's contract of
employment and provide the basis for an action against him by the
employee for breach of his contract. The most important of the
implied terms is the mutual duty to maintain trust and confidence.
This term and the term that places a duty on the employer to provide
for the safety of his employees are the most relevant to bullying.”13
O’ Connell in her article on Bullying in the Workplace notes that a
breach of contract may occur where the employer failed to comply
with fair procedures most notably in dealing with accusations of
bullying; in which case it is possible for both the victim and the
alleged perpetrator to initiate a claim. She further notes that cases
have arisen in the past where perpetrators of bullying have sought
injunctions claiming fair procedures have not been followed, even in
circumstances where it had been shown the perpetrators were
actively involved in bullying fellow employees.14
A consideration of what is fair will depend largely on the facts of
each individual case; the presence or absence of either grievance or
disciplinary procedures will be a critical factor the court or tribunal
will take into account in arriving at a decision.

Breach of express and implied duties under the contract of
employment
Under a contract of employment, whether expressed or implied, an
employee will owe several duties to an employer, including but not
limited to:

. 1. Honesty.
. 2. Loyalty.
. 3. A duty not to act contrary to the employer's interests.
Correspondingly, an employer owes duties to an employee whether
expressed in the contract or implied by law, including but not limited
to:

. 1. Duty of employer to maintain his employee's trust and
confidence.
. 2. Employer's duty to take reasonable care for the safety of his
employees.
. 3. The duty to provide a safe system of work.
. 4. A duty to ensure compliance and enforcement of reasonable
rules of conduct.
. 5. A duty to provide a workplace that is free from harassment.
. 6. A duty to ensure that employees are free to carry out their work
free from harassment.
Of those employer's duties mentioned above perhaps the most
important for the purpose of this article are the duties: to maintain an
employee's trust and confidence, to take reasonable care for their
safety and to provide a workplace free from harassment.

(1) Duty of employer to maintain his employee's trust and confidence
in the employment relationship
In recent years the courts, both in the UK and Ireland, have
demonstrated a willingness to recognise an implied duty placed on
the employer to maintain his employee's trust and confidence. This
duty is not a mutually exclusive obligation, and it applies in a
situation where an employee acting in a supervisory capacity
engages in bullying of a subordinate employee, resulting in an
overall breach of the employer's duty.
The application of the implied duty of trust and confidence to
situations involving bullying represents a novel departure by the
courts and a far remove from the concept originally conceived by the
House of Lords in the case of Malik v BCCI .15 In this case the House
of Lords held that:
“Subject to issues of causation, mitigation and remoteness, an
employee might in principle recover damages for financial loss
stemming from a loss of reputation caused by breach of the
employer's implied obligation not, without reasonable and proper
cause, to conduct itself in a manner likely to destroy or seriously

damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer
and employee.”16
The court noted that an employment contract creates a close personal
relationship where there is often a disparity of power between the
parties. The court observed that employers should not damage their
employees’ future employment prospects by harsh and oppressive
behaviour, or by any other conduct which falls below the standards
set by the implied duty of trust and confidence. Of critical
importance here is the use by Lord Nichols of the expression “any
other conduct” which has evolved over time to embrace conduct of a
bullying nature.
Nevertheless, the expansion of the implied duty of trust and
confidence since Malik has not been without reservation, a point
which can be gleaned from the decision of the House of Lords in the
case Johnson v Unisys Ltd ,17 where the court tried to place some
limits on the evolution of the principle developing to “reflect modern
perceptions of how employees should be treated fairly and with
dignity”. Indeed, when the Johnson case was before the Court of
Appeal, the court citing an earlier decision in Addis v Gramaphone
Company Ltd , did not accept that the Malik principle allowed
damages for the manner in which a dismissal took place. In Johnson
, the plaintiff sought compensation for wrongful dismissal alleging
he suffered a major psychiatric illness from the manner of his
dismissal and the circumstances leading up to it. He claimed
financial loss of £400,000 due to this mental breakdown and his
consequent inability to find employment.18
There is concern that the scope of the implied duty of trust and
confidence is so wide that it could embrace a situation such as the
imposition of an intolerable workload—something which has
traditionally fallen within the remit of constructive dismissal.19
Certainly, there is an ongoing debate in academic circles that,
notwithstanding the Johnson decision, the implied duty of mutual
trust and confidence will evolve to form an all-embracing superprinciple under which each of the more “traditional” implied duties
will rest; although this point has been discounted by many
commentators.20
In this jurisdiction the High Court recently considered the nature and

scope of the implied duty of trust and confidence in a variety of
cases, most interestingly in the decision of Berber v Dunnes Stores.
21
In the context of the implied duty of trust and confidence, Laffoy
J. in the High Court held that the defendant was in breach of the
implied duty in circumstances where the defendant had known of the
precarious nature of the plaintiff's physical and psychological health
and that this amounted to oppressive conduct which seriously
damaged the relationship between the parties.
A breach of the implied duty of trust and confidence was also
considered in the High Court in the case of Pickering v Microsoft
Ireland Operations Limited 22 where the plaintiff, who did not have a
written contract, brought an action for wrongful dismissal,
submitting that in addition to the implied duty of trust and
confidence there was a second implied term in the contract that
required or obliged her employer not to expose her to a risk of
personal injury.23
One of the issues raised in Pickering was whether the plaintiff could
avoid the restrictive principle set down in Addis v Gramaphone
Company that where a servant is dismissed from his employment the
damages for the dismissal cannot include compensation for the
manner of his dismissal, for injured feelings or from the loss he may
sustain from the fact the dismissal makes it more difficult for him to
obtain fresh employment.24
In Pickering , Smith J. considered the restrictive principle in
Johnson 25 and how it was assessed in an earlier judgment of Laffoy
J. in McGrath v Trinitech .26 In particular, the judge referred to the
defendant's submission that: (a) the plaintiff had no right to claim
any remedy, apart from damages at common law, and that these
damages do not include damages for the manner of the plaintiff's
dismissal; (b) whether the implied term of mutual trust and
confidence can be relied on, if it is inconsistent with an express term
in a contract of employment; and (c) the legal position in relation to
an employer's liability for psychiatric injury induced by stress and
pressure at work.
Smith J. considered the proposition that an implied term must be
consistent with an express term (in this case the express term being
the right of the employer under the common law to terminate the

contract of employment, the remedy for this breach of contract being
no more than the remuneration which should have been paid during
the notice period). It was concluded that the common law position in
relation to dismissal had not changed and therefore an implied term
of trust and confidence could not be relied on to circumvent that
principle. However, the court having discounted that point,
considered the implied duty of trust and confidence independent of
and unconnected with the manner of the plaintiff's dismissal; namely
in the context in which the defendant had given expressed
assurances that the plaintiff would be involved in the resolution of
any difficulties arising from the implementation of the reorganisation plan. The court was satisfied that this term had been
breached which amounted to constructive dismissal entitling the
plaintiff to treat the contract as repudiated.
It would appear from the above decisions that the High Court has
recognised the existence of the implied duty of trust and confidence
in this jurisdiction; however, it would also appear that the court, at
least in Pickering , is prepared to limit the scope of its application.

(2) Employer's duty to take reasonable care for the safety of his
employees
It is long established under the law governing contracts of
employment that in the absence of an expressed term there is an
implied duty placed on the employer to take reasonable care for the
safety of all his employees. However, this duty under contract is
mirrored in the law of torts where a general duty of care exists;
therefore a prospective litigant can sue under different headings.
Since the seminal case of Walker v Northumberland County Council
it has been accepted that a breach of a general duty of care could
take place, where it is established that an employer, in this case a
local authority, subjected an employee to unacceptable levels of
stress, caused by a health endangering workload.27 The ambit of this
duty is wide enough to apply to cases of bullying where it is
incumbent on an employer to provide a safe working environment.

In Johnstone v Bloomsbury Health Authority , the plaintiff was
employed as a senior house officer by a hospital authority. His
standard working week was 40 hours; however, he was required to
make himself available for an additional 48 hours on call. In certain
weeks he worked in excess of 88 hours and this over a period of time
adversely affected his health. Stuart-Smith L.J. in his judgment
noted:
“There is no difference between the duty to provide a safe system of
working and the duty to take reasonable care for the safety of the
employee. The former is merely an ingredient in the latter duty…. It
must be remembered that the duty of care is owed to the individual
employee and different employees may have different stamina. If the
defendants in this case knew or ought to have known that by
requiring him to work the hours they did, they exposed him to risk of
injury to his health, then they should not have required him to work
in excess of those hours that he safely could have done”.
The court concluded that the defendants were in breach of an
implied duty of care in that they should not have required the
plaintiff to work so far in excess of his standard working week.
Indeed, it would have been reasonably foreseeable that to do so
would have injured the plaintiff's health.
Recently, the High Court considered the scope of duty in this
jurisdiction both in McGrath and Pickering , the subject of which
will be discussed in greater detail later in this article.

(3) Common law duty on an employer to provide a workplace that is
free from harassment
Even before the introduction of the Employment Equality Acts
1998-2004 , there was an implied duty on an employer to provide a
workplace free from harassment; the Labour Court having
recognised that harassment was a form of discrimination as far back
as 1985 in A Worker v A Garage Proprietor .28 The common law
duty has been somewhat superseded in recent years by the placing of

harassment (including sexual harassment) on a statutory footing. It is
within this context that harassment must now be examined.
As mentioned above, s. 14(A) inserts a new provision into the
Employment Equality Acts dealing with harassment and sexual
harassment, extending it in relation to gender, marital status, family
status, sexual orientation, religion, age, disability, race or
membership of the travelling community.29 This provision provides
that an employee is harassed or sexually harassed either at the place
where he or she is employed or otherwise in the course of his or her
employment. Proving harassment depends on showing that the
victim and the other individual are both employed at that place or by
the same employer; the other individual is the victim's employer; or
the other individual is a client, customer or other business contact of
the victim's employer and the circumstances of the harassment are
such that the employer ought reasonably to have taken steps to
prevent it. The provision goes on to read:
“…or the victim is treated differently in the workplace
(victimisation—harassment) or otherwise in the course of his or her
employment by reason of rejecting or accepting the harassment, or it
could reasonably be anticipated that he or she would be so treated.”
It is clear from the wording of the provision that harassment is a
form of bullying especially where victimisation is present.
Under Art. 11 of the Equal Treatment Directive, Member States
were obliged to introduce measures dealing with victimisation in
their respective legislation.30 The concept of victimisation was
incorporated into the Employment Equality Act 1998 and occurs
where the dismissal or other penalisation of the complainant was
solely or mainly occasioned by the complainant having, in good
faith sought redress under the Acts.31 In the case of Jacqui McCarthy
v Dublin Corporation , the claimant succeeded in her action against
the respondent who was held to be vicariously liable for the actions
of its employees who victimised the claimant for having previously
brought a claim under equality legislation.32 The provision dealing
with vicarious liability is set out under s. 15(1) of the Act, however,
an employer can escape liability in respect of an alleged act of
harassment or victimisation (carried out by subordinates) if he can
demonstrate that he or she took such reasonable steps as were

practicable to prevent the perpetrator (a) from doing that act, or (b)
from doing, in the course of his or her employment, acts of that
description.33
One of the major considerations which an employer must have in
relation to a potential claim for harassment under the Equality Acts
is that scope for compensation is much greater than that provided for
under the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977-1993 .34 This can be seen
from the Atkinson decision in which Delahunt J. awarded a claimant
the sum of €137,000 less 25 per cent for contributory negligence on
account of the plaintiff being aware for a two-year-period prior to
making a complaint that she was sexually harassed.35

Criminal law
Harassment must also be understood within its criminal law context
under the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 .36 The
breadth of this provision is sufficiently wide to encompass situations
that can arise within a working environment; however, the behavior
in question would have to be very serious before the authorities
intervene. In 1997, Parliament in the UK introduced the Protection
Against Harassment Act, a legislative response to the public order
offence of stalking (although the act itself is not confined to that
particular offence). The Protection Against Harassment Act creates
not just a criminal offence for harassment but also provides a
complainant with a civil remedy. The extent of the vicarious liability
of the employer in this context was recently considered in the case of
Majrowski v Guy's and St Thomas's NHS Trust. 37
In Majrowski , the claimant, a homosexual male, brought an action
against his employer for breach of statutory duty, claiming that he
had been unlawfully harassed by a female manager in breach of s. 1
of the Act, maintaining that the employer was vicariously liable.38
The House of Lords upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal in
dismissing the employer's contention that the Act did not provide for
the vicarious liability of the employer.39 In particular, and of
relevance to this article, Nicholl L.J. noted:

“I am at a loss to see why these particular features of this newly
created wrong should be thought to place this wrong in a special
category in which an employer is exempt from vicarious liability. It
is true that this new wrong usually comprises conduct of an intensely
personal character between two individuals. But this feature may
also be present with other wrongs which attract vicarious liability,
such as assault. Nor does imposition of criminal liability only on the
perpetrator of the wrong, and on a person who aids, abets, counsels
or procures the harassing conduct, point to a different conclusion.
Conversion, assault and battery may attract criminal liability as well
as civil liability, but this does not exclude vicarious liability.”

Breach of contract—Wrongful dismissal
Under contract law, an employee can bring an action for wrongful
dismissal where, for example, he or she has brought to the
employer's attention instances of bullying or harassment, a result of
which leads to the victim being dismissed. Consequently, the
employee can initiate a claim in either the Circuit Court or indeed
the High Court for damages.40 The nature of the wrongful dismissal
action will depend on whether the employee was dismissed without
proper notice,41 or as the case may be, the employee was dismissed
summarily.42 Depending on the circumstances of the case the
employee has an option of either pursuing a claim for wrongful
dismissal in the courts or bringing a case for unfair dismissal before
the Employment Appeals Tribunal.43
The nature of a wrongful dismissal action was considered in the case
of Wallace v United Grain Growers Ltd , in which McLaughlin J. in
the Canadian Supreme Court stated:
“… ‘wrongful dismissal’ action is not concerned with the wrongness
or rightness of the dismissal itself. Far from making dismissal a
wrong, the law entitles both employer and employee to terminate the
employment relationship without cause. A wrong arises only if the
employer breaches the contract by failing to give the dismissed
employee reasonable notice of termination. The remedy for this

breach of contract is an award of damages based on the period of
notice which should have been given.”
Whereas claims for wrongful dismissal are limited if taken within
the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, the same cannot be said for
claims taken within the jurisdiction of the High Court. However,
typically the award is normally concerned with compensating the
plaintiff for inadequate notice and the amount of damages will often
be limited to the wages due under the notice period.

Constructive dismissal
Perhaps the most recognisable avenue for seeking redress for actions
amounting to bullying in the workplace is where the employee
resigns from the position of employment and brings an action for
constructive dismissal or discharge by breach as it was originally
referred to.44 However, this is perhaps the riskiest course of action a
potential litigant may take; s.1 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts 19772005 defines constructive dismissal as:
“The termination by the employee of his contract of employment
with his employer whether prior notice of the termination was or
was not given to the employer in circumstances in which, because of
the conduct of the employer the employee was or would have been
entitled or it was or would have been reasonable for the employee to
terminate the contract of employment without giving prior notice of
the termination to the employer.”45
It should be noted that a claim for constructive dismissal is not
limited to the Unfair Dismissals legislation; an action may be
brought under s.2 of the Equality Acts 1998-2004 which includes
constructive dismissal within the definition of dismissal.46 Such a
claim can be pursued before the Equality Tribunal, or in the case of
gender discrimination, to the Circuit Court. As mentioned above, in
the context of harassment the Tribunal not only has the power to
award compensation, re-instatement or re-engagement, but
accordingly may also award damages. Not surprisingly, the equality

route for dismissal is becoming increasingly popular particularly
among non-nationals who are the victims of bullying in the
workplace.47
One of the quintessential problems with any case for constructive
dismissal is whether the employee left his employment too soon or
correspondingly too late.48 It is of course possible for an employee to
leave on account of one act of bullying, provided the behaviour was
particularly serious. In respect of a situation where an employee is
exposed to unacceptable behaviour over a period of time, the
tribunal will consider whether the complainant made use of the
grievance procedure; the nature of that procedure; whether the rules
applying to that procedure were followed or ignored, and
furthermore who was the person(s) to whom the employee
complained—was the referee impartial and removed from both the
complainant and the perpetrator(s)?49 The Tribunal has made it quite
clear that in order to succeed “the complainant must demonstrate,
and the tribunal must find as a matter of fact, that the financial loss
is attributable to the dismissal”. Perhaps the most high profile case
involving bullying and constructive dismissal in recent years was the
case of Liz Allen v Independent Newspapers where the complainant
was awarded the sum of £70,500 or 78 weeks pay.50
Traditionally, for a constructive dismissal action to succeed the
plaintiff had to make a complaint; however, there is now authority
that in a limited number of circumstances an employee may not have
to if the person they should complain to is in fact the perpetrator of
the alleged conduct which led them to leave their position.51
However, an employee should, where practicable, use the grievance
procedure; failure to do so in circumstances where it is reasonable
to, will militate against a complainant.
Recently in the UK, the Employment Appeals Tribunal in Abbey
National Plc v Fairbrother ,52 considered the scope of constructive
dismissal in the context of discrimination and the appropriate use of
grievance procedures. The case is an authority for the proposition
that conduct by an employer said to destroy the implied term of trust
and confidence inherent in the employer/employee relationship (and
so entitling the employee to resign and claim constructive dismissal)
will not do so if the employer had reasonable and proper cause for
the conduct in question.

A claim for a trade dispute under the Industrial Relations Act 1969
O’ Sullivan in his article on Preventing and Defending Stress and
Bullying at Work Cases notes that there is a more unusual route for
taking a bullying claim under the Industrial Relations Act 1969 .
Section 9 of that Act provides that where there is a trade dispute as
defined under the Industrial Relations Act 1946 , a case may be
referred to the Rights Commission. The Rights Commissioner may
make a recommendation, however his/her decision is not binding
unless the employer agrees to be bound under s.20 of the Industrial
Relations Act 1969 .53

Conclusion
Having established that there are a variety of actionable causes for
cases involving bullying, stress and harassment, and having
demonstrated how the law in this field has evolved in tandem with
existing common law rules and statutory provisions, it is fair to say
that the existing laws have been used by litigants to seek redress in
the absence of dedicated legislation. The concluding part of this
article will examine how the courts in the UK and Ireland have dealt
with the emergence of the tortious claims for psychiatric injuries
relating to bullying, stress and harassment cases. Furthermore, the
author will examine in light of recent developments, whether it is
desirable to consolidate and codify employment rights law in order
to provide clarity to prospective litigants. Finally, the author will
argue that if codification is required, then this will necessitate a
change in the nature of present jurisdictions for bringing claims
involving bullying, stress and harassment in the workplace.54
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